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Legal Limits on Development Exactions:
Responding to Nollan and Dolan
MARK W. CORDES*

INTRODUCTION

Over the last thirty years local governments have increasingly relied on
development exactions as a funding source for land use development.'
Faced with shrinking budgets and the need to provide services attendant to
growth, cities and counties have used the development approval process to
require developers to provide both land and money to offset the perceived
costs that development places on a community. These exactions might be
required at any stage of development requiring government approval, but
present the same choice to developers: make the required contribution if you
want to proceed with development.
Although exactions might take a variety of forms and serve a number
of functions, 2 they typically fall into three general categories: either
dedication of land, money in lieu of land, or impact fees. At their best
exactions reflect a sincere government effort to require developers to pay for
the costs development places on the surrounding community.3 At its worst

* B.S., Portland State University; J.D., Williamette University College of Law;
J.S.M., Stanford Law School; Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University
College of Law.
1. See, e.g., ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ, REGULATION FOR
REVENUE 19-20, 35-39 (1994); Paul P. Downing & Thomas S. McCaleb, The Economics of
Development Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS, 43-45 (James E. Frank & Robert M.
Rhodes eds., 1987); Gus Bauman & William H. Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact
Fees: A Survey of American Practices,50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 62 (Winter 1987).
The literature on development exactions has also become voluminous in recent years. See
generally ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS (James E. Frank &

Robert M. Rhodes eds., 1987).
2. For example, one commentator compiled a nonexhaustive list of fourteen forms
that exactions might take including physical dedications, fees in lieu of dedication, provision
of public improvements, lump sum payments, construction of public improvements outside
the development area, provision of services and profit sharing with the jurisdiction. See
LouIs F. WESCHLER ET AL., Politics and Administration of Development Exactions in
DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS, 21-22 (James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes eds., 1987).
3. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606, 610-11
(Cal. 1970) (requiring dedication of land for park reasonable response to loss of open space
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the system has been a means by which governmeits can use their monopoly
power to extort from &velopers property interests often unrelated to the
proposed development.4
Until recently judicial policing of exactions had been left entirely to the
states, with courts reflecting a variety of approaches to how far government
could reach in imposing exactions.5 This changed eight years ago when the
Supreme Court for the first time addressed the issue of development
exactions in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.6 In that case the
Court established that at a minimum there must be an "essential nexus"
between any required dedication of land and the purposes that would have
justified denial of a building permit.7 In setting this standard, however, the
Court did not address the required degree of connection between a required
exaction and the projected impact of proposed development. Thus, even
though Nollan established that exactions must be connected to the projected
development impact, it left open the degree of required connection.
Seven years later the Court again addressed the issue of development
exactions in Dolan v. City of Tigard,s where it addressed the question left
open in Nollan concerning the required degree of connection between the
exaction and development impact. In holding that a required greenway
dedication and a required bikepath dedication were both invalid, the Court
held that there must be "rough proportionality" between any required
dedication and projected impacts of development. 9 Perhaps more significantly, the Court placed the burden of establishing "rough proportionality"
on the city and indicated that the city had to quantify the extent of the
proportionality.'"
The full impact of Dolan is yet to be seen, but it will undoubtedly
prove to be a significant decision in land use law. Although the Court
suggested it was following what it identified as the middle position of
states, 1' the requirements it imposed on local governments to justify
exactions arguably go beyond those imposed by many of those middle
states. This is particularly true concerning the need to quantify the
and crowded recreational areas caused by residential development).
4. See J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinsen, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1981)
(holding that exaction in question constituted "an out-and-out plan of extortion").
5. See infra, part I.B.

6. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
7. Id. at 837.
8. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
9. Id. at 2319-20.
10. See id. at 2322 ("No precision mathematical calculation is required, but the city
must make some effort to quantify its findings . .
11. See id. at 2318.
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connection between impact and exaction. Just as importantly, Dolan is the
latest in a line of Supreme Court cases affirming the importance of property
2
rights and indicating the Court's resolve to take such rights seriously.'
At the same time, the potential impact of Dolan should not be
overemphasized. Though recognizing property rights, the Court clearly and
repeatedly affirmed the right of local governments to engage in land use
controls in general 3 and to impose reasonable development exactions in
particular. Indeed, the Court clearly affirmed the right and even need of
reasonable development exactions to pay for
local governments to impose
4
development.
of
the cost
The basic message of Dolan is therefore quite simple: government may
impose exactions to offset the impact of development, but the exactions
must relate to and flow from the development itself. Government cannot
use the land use approval process to capture an interest unrelated to the
impact of development. As a practical matter, this provides governments
with substantial room with which to work, although the burden will clearly
be on the government to justify exactions that are imposed. Despite the
clarity of this central message, the full reach of Dolan is still uncertain with
regard to several important matters. First is whether the decision applies to
exactions other than physical dedications of land. Second is the potential
impact the decision has on state law standards. Although the Court
suggested it was following the majority of jurisdictions that have adopted
a middle position in reviewing exactions, the Court's analysis itself indicates
that it might indeed have gone further.
This article will examine the impact of Dolan on exaction law. Part
one will first examine the growth of exactions and state law standards in
policing their use. Part two will then examine the Supreme Court's decision
in Nollan. Part three will then examine the Dolan decision itself. Finally,
the last three sections of the article will address three basic questions that
remain after Dolan: (1) when does the Dolan test apply? (2) what impact
12. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (holding land
use regulation which deprives owner of all economic viability constitutes a taking); Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (conditioning building permit on
exaction unrelated to development impact constitutes a taking); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding government must pay
just compensation for temporary regulatory taking).
13. See, e.g., 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (noting that the Court has long recognized authority
of local government to engage in land use planning); Id. at 2322 ("cities have long engaged
in the commendable task of land use planning ... ").
14. Id. at 2322. By establishing the "rough proportionality" standard and affirming the
"reasonable relationship" standard adopted by many state courts, the Dolan majority clearly
indicated that local governments could impose reasonable exaction requirements.
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will Dolan have on state law standards? and (3) what exactions appear to be
most at risk under the Dolan test?
I. BACKGROUND
A.

DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS

The term "development exaction" generally refers to the practice of
requiring a developer to provide land or money in return for a needed
development approval. " Development, while often beneficial to a
community, also brings a variety of costs to a community in the form of
required services. Development adds children to the schools, traffic to the
streets, increased use of parks, burdens on sewers, and assorted other costs
to a community.' 6 In theory, exactions simply require a developer to pay
for the increased costs of services that accompany development. In this
sense they might be loosely described as user fees. 7
Property law has long recognized the right of local governments to
require payment for the costs created by development." Special assessments, though distinct from exactions in several respects, 9 have long
permitted government to assess landowners for the costs of improvements. 20 Similarly, dedication of internal subdivision improvements, such

15. See, e.g., ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 1, at 3; James E. Frank &
Robert M. Rhodes, Introduction, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS, 1, 2-4 (James E. Frank &
Robert M. Rhodes eds., 1987); Donald L. Connors & Michael E. High, The Expanding Circle
of Exactions: From Dedication to Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 70 (Winter
1987).
16. See ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 1, at 77-96; see also, Downing &
McCaleb, supra note 1, at 49-50 ("property taxes paid by new development unlikely to be
sufficient to cover the costs of the public services provided").
17. See, e.g., James C. Nicholas, Impact Exactions: Economic Theory, Practice, and
Incidence, 50 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 85, 88 (Winter 1987) ("Although exactions may or
may not constitute user fees as such, exactions and user fees share a common heritage");
WESCHLER ElT AL., supra note 2, at 33 (suggesting some communities view exactions as user
fees).
18. For a general discussion of early exaction related practices, see Fred P. Bosselman
& Nancy Stroud, Legal Aspects of Development Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS 7073 (James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes eds., 1987).
19. ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 1,at 17. Special assessments differ from
exactions in at least three ways: "First, special assessments fall on all property owners in a
defined benefit zone, not merely those undertaking development. Second, they are imposed
for the direct benefit of those assessed rather than of future customers or the community at
large. In most cases, finally, special assessments are imposed at the explicit request of
property owners in the affected benefit zone." Id.
20. See id.
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as streets and sidewalks, have been common since the 1920s and with near
universal practice by the middle of this century." Requirement of such onsite improvements have been viewed as necessary to address a host of
problems caused by unimproved lots.22
The years after World War II saw a surge in housing development and
with it an expansion of the types of exactions communities sought to
impose. In particular, communities began to require developers to dedicate
land for schools, parks, and other public uses. 23 In the alternative,
developers were frequently permitted to provide fees-in-lieu of dedication,
especially where the land involved was too small to serve the intended
24
purpose. These fees could then be pooled to acquire the necessary land.
Extending exactions to land dedications for parks and schools was a
significant step beyond internal street dedications, since such new uses were
generally not exclusively reserved for occupants of the subdivision.
Recent years have seen continued expansion of the types of uses f6r
which exactions are sought, with municipalities frequently seeking exactions
for a number of off-site facilities. Particularly significant has been use of
impact fees as a form of development exaction. Impact fees are typically
one-time fees imposed on a developer to offset a variety of potential
impacts, on the theory that the cost of providing services for new developments can be determined in advance. 25 Although conceptually similar to
land dedications and fees in lieu of land, impact fees provide greater
flexibility in the type and scope of projects that might be funded. Impact
fees today might be used for a number of off-site uses, such as sewage
treatment plants, road development, drainage systems, water systems, parks,
and schools.26
Recent studies have indicated that exaction use has grown to significant
proportions, especially since 1970.27 Several explanations have been

21. See R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community
Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments:A BriefHistory of Land Development Exactions,
50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6 (Winter 1987); see also WESCHLER ET AL., supra note 2,
at 17-18.
22. See Smith, supra note 21, at 6.
23. See Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 18, at 73; WESCHLER ET AL., supra note 2,
at 17-18.
24. See, e.g., WESCHLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 18.
25. See Smith, supra note 21, at 16.
26. See WESCHLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 19..
27. See ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 1, at 35-39 (reviewing recent
studies); Elizabeth D. Purdam & James E. Frank, Community Use of Exactions: Results of
a National Survey, in DEVELOPMENT EXAcTIoNs (James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes eds.,
1987) (discussing results of a 1985 national survey); Bauman & Ethier, supra note 1.
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offered for this surge, foremost of which is the increasing financial restraints
faced by local governments. 28 As federal and state revenue sharing has
decreased, together with increased pressure to limit property taxes, local
governments have resorted to exactions and impact fees as a means to
finance services for new construction. Other rationales have also been given
for the growth of exactions, including greater community ability to control
growth and rise of the environmental movement.29
Whatever the reasons for the recent surge in exaction use, required
dedication of property and/or payment of impact fees to gain development
approval clearly implicates the property rights of landowners. The next
section will briefly discuss state law standards in policing exactions.
B.

STATE LAW STANDARDS

Judicial review of exaction requirements have traditionally fallen
entirely on state courts. In struggling for a rationale to uphold the practice,
several early decisions resorted to what became known as the "privilege"
theory of exactions. These courts reasoned that subdivision development
was a privilege that developers voluntarily applied for, and thus acquiesced
to any conditions that might be imposed as part of the process.3 a The
"privilege" theory thus avoided some of the difficult taking issues that
accompany exaction practice, but granted almost unlimited discretion to
local government in the type of exactions they might impose. As a practical
matter, no courts currently follow the "privilege" theory.
In stark contrast to the "privilege" theory, several decisions from the
early 1960s applied very exacting standards in reviewing development
exactions.3 Most significant was the Illinois Supreme Court decision in
Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect,3 2 where in striking down

28. A number of commentators have suggested that financial restraints have led to
increased use of exactions. See, e.g., ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 1, at 23-26;
Downing & McCaleb, supra note 1, at 44; Connors & High, supra note 15, at 69.
29. See ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 1; WESCHLER ET AL., supra note
2, at 33.
30. See, e.g., Newton v. American Security Co., 148 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Ark. 1941);
Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 217 N.W. 58 (Mich. 1928); Brous v. Smith, 106
N.E.2d 503, 506-07 (N.Y. 1952); see generally, Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 18, at 7172; Thomas M. Pavelko, Comment, Subdivision Exactions: A Review of Judicial Standards,
25 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 269, 283 (1983).
31. See Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill.
1961) (citing specifically and uniquely attributable test); Gules & Assocs. v. Town of
Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960); ajffd, 15 A.D.2d 815, 225
N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962) (citing direct need test).
32. 176 N.E.2d 799 (I1. 1961).
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a required land dedication for schools the court established what has become
known as the "specific and uniquely attributable" test.33 This test has
generally been interpreted to require that "the exaction is directly proportional to a specifically created need," and to limit exactions to those that are
specifically and uniquely attributable to the development. Since the town's
school facilities were already utilized to capacity, the court noted the need
for new schools were not uniquely attributable to the new development,
making the exaction invalid.' Although primarily associated with Illinois,
several other jurisdictions have at one time or another adopted the "specific
and uniquely attributable" language in reviewing subdivision exactions.35
Although the Supreme Court and several commentators have suggested
that the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test still commands a strong
minority position, 36 its current viability is questionable. 37 Although the
language is still used at times, several of the decisions that adopted it no
longer follow it with rigor. Even the Illinois Supreme Court, though still
characterizing its standard as the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test,
arguably relaxed it in a 1977 decision. 38 The court indicated that the
dedication did not need to uniquely benefit the development, but only that
it provide a partial benefit to and be "fairly proportioned" to the required
exaction, 39 a clear contrast to Pioneer Trust. Thus, although Illinois would
still appear to apply a more rigorous review than most states, it no longer
requires an exacting relationship between exaction and development.'

33. Id. at 801.
34. Id. at 802.
35. See Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 273 A.2d 880 (Conn.
1970); McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 270 NE.2d 370, 374 (Ohio 1971); Frank
Ansuini, Inc. v. Cranston, 264 A.2d 910, 913 (R.I. 1970).
36. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 n.7 (1995) (noting that
"specifically and uniquely attributable" test minority position); Nicholas U. Morosoff, "'Take'
my Beach Please": Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus
ConstitutionalAnalysis of Development Exactions, 69 B.U. L. REV. 823, 868 (1989) (citing
specifically and uniquely attributable" test strong minority position); Pavelko, supra note 30
at 25 (citing a strong minority position).
37. See Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 18, at 74 (suggesting no state still follows
"specifically and uniquely attributable" test as originally established and that it "is now of
historical interest only").
38. See Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 369 N.E.2d 892 (Iil. 1977).
39. Id. at 895.
40. In its most recent decision, Northern I11.
Home Builders Ass'n v. DuPage County,
649 N.E.2d 384 (III. 1995), announced after Dolan, the Illinois Supreme Court applied the
"specifically and uniquely attributable" test to two state enabling statutes, which permitted
counties to adopt transportation impact fees on new development. Although the legislature
had repealed the first statute and replaced it with the second statute, local ordinances had
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The vast majority of states today articulate one of two related standards
in reviewing subdivision exactions: the "rational nexus" test or the
"reasonable relationship" test. Although courts and commentators disagree
on whether these are distinct tests or essentially the same,4 ' this confusion
been enacted under both ordinances and thus both required review. The court stated that its
standard of review was the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test from Pioneer Trust,
and that only the second of the two statutes met that test. The second statute met that
standard largely because it explicitly incorporated the test, stating that road impact fees must
be "specifically and uniquely attributable to the traffic demands generated by the new
development paying the fee." 605 ILCS 5/5-906(a)(1). The statute defined "specifically and
uniquely attributable" to mean that a new development creates the need, or an identifiable
portion of the need, and that the development must receive a direct and material benefit from
improvements made with the fee. The court found this comported with Pioneer Trust, since
developers had to contribute to improvements required by their activity, but not for
improvements caused by the community as a whole. 649 N.E.2d at 390.
Conversely, the first enabling act was invalid, largely because it failed to explicitly
incorporate the "specifically and uniquely attributable" language into the act itself. Id.
Further, the act did not limit fees to that portion of the improvements necessitated by the
development, but instead stated that fees be set to fund all road improvements "needed to
maintain a reasonable level of service." Id. at 390. Thus, the level of community need,
rather than the portion of need contributed by the development, determined fees, which was
impermissible.
This decision clearly shows a relatively rigorous review of exactions. Yet the statute
that was upheld basically conforms to the Illinois Supreme Court's more relaxed standard
articulated in Krughoff. In particular, the statute only required that fees be proportionate to
need created by the development and was interpreted by the court not to require that
improvements be used exclusively or overwhelmingly by the development paying the fee.
Id. Although clearly requiring some scrutiny, such requirements are consistent with both the
"rational nexus" test described infra notes 41-66 and even Dolan's "rough proportionality"
standard.
41. Several courts and commentators clearly view the "rational nexus" test as a distinct
and more rigorous standard than the "reasonable relationship" test, see, e.g., Wald Corp. v.
Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863, 865-68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Holmes v.
Planning Bd. of New Castle, 433 N.Y.S.2d 587, 598-99 (A.D.N.Y. 1980); Batch v. Town of
Chapel Hill, 376 S.E.2d 22, 31 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989); Rachel M. Janutis, Note, Nollan and
Dolan: "Taking" a Link Out of the Development Chain, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 981, 989-993
(1994); Smith, supra note 21, at 13-14; John J. Delaney et al., The Needs-Nexus Analysis:
A Unified Test for Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 148-54 (1987). While others have explicitly or implicitly viewed
them as being essentially the same test, see, e.g., Howard County v. JJM, Inc., 482 A.2d 908,
920 (Md. 1984); Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980); City
of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 807 (Tex. 1984); Jerold S. Kayden
& Robert Pollard, Linkage Ordinances and TraditionalExactions Analysis: The Connection
Between Office Development and Housing, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 126, 126-27 n. 3
(1987); Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 18, at 75-78 (implicitly suggesting same test);
Pavelko, supra note 30, at 287-88 n.107.
More generally, courts and commentators differ significantly in how they organize
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is largely a result of the manner in which the "reasonable relationship" test
is applied. As a practical matter both tests reject the more extreme positions
of the privilege theory and the "specific and uniquely attributable" tests,
instead requiring some relationship between the required exaction and
development impacts, but not total precision. As will be discussed below,

however, courts have differed in the rigor given the "reasonable relation"
test, with some in effect equating it with "rational nexus" and others
applying it more deferentially.
The most commonly articulated state standard today is the "rational
nexus" test, which requires that exactions "bear a rational nexus to the needs
created by, and benefits conferred upon, the subdivision." 42 This test is
usually traced to Jordan v. Village of Menomomee Falls, 43 where the
Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the more rigid "specific and uniquely
attributable" test and instead required that there be a "reasonable connection"
between the proposed subdivision and the required exaction."4 The actual
phrase "rational nexus" was first used several years later by the New Jersey
Supreme Court,45 and has since been adopted by a number of other courts."

the different state tests for reviewing exactions. Several state there are three distinct
standards: (1) specifically and uniquely attributable; (2) rational nexus; and (3) reasonable
relationship. See, e.g., Wald Corp., 338 So. 2d at 865-68; Holmes, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 598-99;
Batch, 376 S.E.2d at 31; Delaney et al., supra at 148-54. Others suggest three distinct tests,
but ones different in nature; see Conners & High, supra note 15, at 75-76 ((1) strict need
test; (2) specifically and uniquely attributable test; (3) rational nexus test); Morosoff, supra
note 36, at 864-70 (1) Judicial-deference test; (2) specifically and uniquely attributable test;
(3) rational-nexus test); Pavelko, supra note 36, at 284-88 (same). Clifford B. Olshaker,
Note, Uncertainty in the Empire State: A Reevaluation of New York's Taxings Jurisprudence
After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1849, 1863-66 (1995) (same). Finally,
several have suggested there is just one current standard, either "rational-nexus" or
"reasonable relationship," although it might be applied with varying degrees of scrutiny. See
Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 18, at 75-78; Kayden & Pollard, supra at 126-27 n.3;
Olshaker, supra at 1865 n.82.
42. Longridge Builders v. Planning Bd. of Princeton, 245 A.2d 336, 337 (N.J. 1969).
43. 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965), appeal dismissed 385 U.S. 4 (1966). Most
commentators discussing the "rational nexus" test attribute its beginning to Jordan, even
though the phrase "rational nexus" was not used in that decision. See, e.g., JULIAN C.
JURGENSMEYER & DONALD G. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT
CONTROL LAW § 7.8 (2d ed. 1986); Morosoff, supra note 36, at 869-70.
44. See 137 N.W.2d at 448.
45. Longridge Builders v. Planning Bd. of Princeton, 245 A.2d 336, 337 (N.J. 1969).
46. See Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863, 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976); Howard County v. JJM, Inc., 482 A.2d 908, 920-21 (Md. 1984); Arrowhead Dev. Co.
v. Livingston County Rd. Comm'n, 283 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Mich. 1979); Batch v. Town of
Chapel Hill, 376 S.E.2d 22, 31 (N.C. 1989);'Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield,
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As initially suggested in Jordan and commonly stated today, the
"rational nexus" test has two components. First, there must be a rational
nexus between the required exaction and the need generated by development.4 7 Although not calling for precision, there must be some proportion
or reasonable connection between what is being required of the developer
and the burden imposed by the development. 4 Second, there must also be
a nexus between the exaction and benefits accruing to the subdivision.49
In essence this requires that the demanded exactions in fact are used to
address the needs created by the development.50 This can be met in
several ways, such as clearly earmarking funds or by showing that
expenditures for facilities exceed the value of required exactions.5'
As noted above, a number of courts use a "reasonable relationship"
standard instead of a "rational nexus" test. 52 This often appears quite
similar to the "rational nexus" test and involves a similar analysis, 53 with
courts at times citing to rational nexus cases. Importantly, both tests make
clear that the required exaction must to some degree relate to the purported
need created by development, and yet do not demand complete precision in
the relationship. Thus, under both standards, the fact that exactions might
54
benefit others than just those in the subdivision does not make it invalid.

379 A.2d 200, 204-05 (N.H. 1977); Robert Mueller Assocs. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Buffalo
Twp., 373 A.2d 1173, 1174 n.1 (Pa. 1977).
47. See, e.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); Longridge Builders v. Planning Bd. of Princeton, 245 A.2d 336, 337 (N.J. 1969).
48. See, e.g., Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 379 A.2d 200, 204-05
(N.J. 1977); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 448 (Wis. 1965);
JURGENSMEYER & HAGMAN, supra note 43, at 210-11.
49. See Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cnty, 431 So. 2d 606, 611-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); JURGENSMEYER & HAGMAN, supra note 43, at 211-12; Bosselman & Stroud, supra
note 18, at 80-81.
50. See Contractors & Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin, 329 So.
2d 314 (Fla. 1976); Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 611-12 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983); JURGENSMEYER & HAGMAN, supranote 43, at 211-12; Bosselman & Stroud,
supra note 18, at 80-81.
51. See JURGENSMEYER & HAGMAN, supra note 43 at 211; Bosselman & Stroud, supra
note 18, at 80-81.
52. See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 207 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1949); Collis
v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (Minn. 1976); Home Builders Ass'n v. City of
Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832, 834-35 (Mo. 1977); Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292
N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980); City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d
802, 807 (Tex. 1984); Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979).
53. See, e.g., Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980); City of
College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 807 (Tex. 1984) (applying two prong
need and benefit analysis).
54. See, e.g., Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 24-26 (Minn. 1976)
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Despite the similarity of articulated standards used by most courts
today, some significant differences emerge with regard to how those
standards are actually applied, particularly regarding the required degree of
relationship between exaction and development impact, and how that
relationship is established. A number of courts under both the "rational
nexus" and "reasonable relationship" tests appear to require some proportional or substantial degree of relationship. For example, the most commonly
articulated version of the "rational nexus" test states that developers can be
required to pay only that "portion of the cost that bears a "rational nexus"
to their development, 55 which some courts have explicitly stated is a
proportionality or apportionment standard.56 Other courts have used
language suggesting a proportionality requirement, such as permitting
exactions "to the extent" of the created need 57 or interpreting rational as
"substantial."5 8 Although not calling for precise calculations, each of
these
suggest some generalized form of cost accounting, in which a developer can
be required to provide exactions proportional to the burden imposed on
society.
Other courts, however, have applied a more relaxed standard, often
applying a standard of review similar to the rational basis level of review
under constitutional analysis. This is particularly true with some decisions
applying the "reasonable relationship" standard, which has been interpreted
to require only some relationship. Under this more relaxed "reasonable
relationship" approach, an exaction is valid if there is some connection
between the required exaction and projected development impact 59 or if the
"proposed development is a contributing factor to the problem sought
to be

(relying on rational nexus cases); Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301
(Neb. 1980) (applying rational nexus cases).
55. See, e.g., Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 448 (Wis.
1965).
56. See Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (Minn. 1976) ("reasonable
portion"); Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 379 A.2d 200, 204-05 (N.H.
1977) ("proportionality test"); Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Princeton, 245
A.2d 336, 338 (N.J. 1968) ("apportionment"); Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 376 S.E.2d 22,
32 (N.C. 1989) ("prorated portion").
57. See Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Mo.
1977).
58. See Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980); 181 Inc.
v. Salem County Planning Bd., 336 A.2d 501, 506 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975).
59. See Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 207 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1949); Associated
Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1971), appeal dismissed,
404 U.S. 878 (1971); Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985).
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alleviated." ° Moreover, some courts give substantial deference to the
government's own assertion that the necessary relationship exists. This is
perhaps most clearly seen in Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone
County,61 where the Montana Supreme Court upheld a required dedication
of the land for subdivision approval. Although the court used language
suggesting a rigorous standard of review, it proceeded to hold that it was
62
sufficient that the municipality found that such a need existed.
Several California and New York decisions in particular have applied
the "reasonable relationship" test in a very deferential manner, in essence
equating it with the police power. For example, in an early decision, Ayres
v. City Council,63 the California Supreme Court upheld the validity of an
off-site dedication, stating that such a dedication would be valid as long as
it was "reasonably related" to the proposed development. In applying this
standard, though, the court readily accepted the asserted relationship offered
Later California65 and New York' decisions have given
by the city.'
a similar deferential review to exactions.
In sum, most state court decisions in recent years apply either a
"rational nexus" test or "reasonable relationship" test when reviewing the
validity of development exactions. Although these tests are at times used
interchangeably, some courts have equated the "reasonable relationship" test
with a very deferential review. Generally speaking, all recent decisions have
recognized the need for some relationship between the required exaction and
projected development impact, but usually do not demand a precise fit. The
degree of relationship varies, however, with many decisions requiring some
form of proportionality, while others would require only some connection.
Courts also differ with regard to how the relationship is established, though
most do not appear to require a clear quantification of the relationship.
Until recently the above state standards were the only developed law
regarding development exactions. The next section will discuss Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court's first foray into the
60. Holmes v. Planning Bd. of New Castle, 433 N.Y.S.2d 587, 598 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980).
61. 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964).
62. Id. at 187-88.
63. 207 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1949).
64. Id. at 5.
65. See Associated Homebuilders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal.
1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 223
Cal. Rptr. 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
66. See Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966); Holmes v.
Planning Rd. of New Castle, 433 N.Y.S.2d 587, 598 (A.D.N.Y. 1980).
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area of development exactions.
II. NOLLAN V. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION
A.

FACTS

In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,6 7 the Supreme Court for
the first time examined the constitutionality of a development exaction
requirement. In Nollan the plaintiffs applied to the California Coastal
Commission for a permit to replace an existing bungalow with a three
bedroom house. The Commission granted the permit subject to the
condition that the Nollans dedicate a public easement across their property
between the high-tide mark and a seawall on their property."
The
easement was designed to connect two public beaches that were separated
by the Nollans' property; indeed, forty-three of the Nollans' beachfront
neighbors had already granted similar easements as a condition to acquire
building permits.6 9
The Nollans challenged the imposition of the easement condition and
were granted the right to a full evidentiary hearing on the validity of the
permit condition.7' After the hearing, the Coastal Commission affirmed
imposition of the permit condition on the basis that the new house would
increase blockage of the ocean view, thus contributing to a "psychological
barrier" that would burden the public's ability to use the beach. 7' The
easement was therefore justified to partially offset that burden. The Nollans
successfully challenged the condition in the trial court,72 but the California
Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the permit condition was valid. 73
Citing to an earlier California decision,74 the court stated that an access
condition on development was sufficiently related to a development's impact
as long as the project contributed to the need for access, even if the
development was not solely responsible for the need and the relationship
was only indirect.75

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Id. at 827-28.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 828-29.
Id. at 829.
223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
See Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
223 Cal. Rptr. at 30-31.
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SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that if the Coastal
Commission had simply made an outright demand for the easement it would
constitute a taking, since it would involve a physical invasion of land.76
The Court emphasized that it has long recognized the right to exclude others
as "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights, 7 noting that
physical invasions of property have consistently been considered takings no
matter how minimal the economic impact of the action. 78 An easement
would clearly constitute a physical invasion and thus a taking.79
The Court proceeded to note, however, that if the Commission had a
valid basis to deny the permit altogether, then it certainly should have the
power to grant the permit subject to a condition designed to serve the same
purpose as an outright denial, even if the condition standing alone would
constitute a taking. 0 The Court reasoned that if the prohibition would be
valid under the police power, "it would be strange to conclude that
providing the owner an alternative to that prohibition which accomplishes
the same purpose" would be invalid.8 ' Thus, for example, a condition that
required the Nollans to provide a viewing spot on their property to let
passersby see the ocean would be valid if the Commission could have
denied the permit because it would block the view of the ocean. Although
such a viewing spot, standing alone, would constitute a taking, the power to
forbid construction "surely include[s] the power to condition construction
8
upon some concession of property rights that serves the same end." .
The key to such an analysis, however, is that there be an "essential
nexus" between the grounds for denying the permit and the purposes served
by the permit condition.83 Without such a nexus, the permit condition is
nothing more than an effort to use its monopoly power to obtain a property
right without paying just compensation. As such, it amounts to extortion. 4
Having established this "essential nexus" test, the Court proceeded to
apply it to the easement condition before it. The Court assumed, without

76. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
77. Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433
(1983)).
78. Id. at 831-32.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
See id. at 836.
Id.at 836-37.
Id. at 836.
Id. at 837.
Id.
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deciding, that the Commission could have denied the permit altogether
because of the blockage of view. 85 Nevertheless, the condition was invalid
because there was no perceived nexus between the easement along the beach
and the development impact that would have justified denial of the permitblocking "visual access" to the beach from the street. In particular, the
Court said that it was "impossible to understand" how requiring that people
already on the beach be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduced
the problem of blocked view which is the problem posed by the development.8 6 The Court declined to address the issue of how much of a
connection there had to be between the permit condition and the problems
posed by development, noting that under even a loose "reasonable basis"
standard the condition failed.8 7 It suggested in dictum, however, that it
might require a more substantial degree of connection.88
Because Nollan involved the unusual scenario where there is no
connection between an exaction and development impact, the full import of
the "essential nexus" standard was left undeveloped. The case clearly
established two points, however. First, at a minimum there must be some
nexus or connection between a required exaction and the projected impact
of development.8 9 In this sense the Court made clear that development
rights were not just for sale, but that conditions had to be in response to
projected impacts.
Second, though not specifying the degree of required connection, the
Court indicated that it would take a hard look at any purported connections
between exaction and development impact. The Court emphasized that the
Fifth Amendment was "more than a pleading requirement" and that
compliance was "more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination. " '
Thus, courts are to take a hard look at the reasons offered for the exaction,

85. Id. at 836-37.
86. Id. at 838-39.
87. Id. at 838.
88. In response to Justice Brennan's dissent which stated that the Commission "should
have little difficulty in the future" in demonstrating the required connection between access
and burden, see Nollan, 483 U.S. at 862, the Court stated that the Fifth Amendment was
"more than a pleading requirement, and compliance with it more than an exercise in
cleverness and imagination." Id. at 841. It then emphasized that its earlier cases reviewing
restrictions on property rights required a "'substantial advancing' of a legitimate state
interest." Id. (emphasis in original). It stated that this choice of adjective was important
where conveyance of a property interest (i.e. the easement) was a condition of development,
"since in that context there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the
compensation requirement, rather than the stated police power objective." Id.
89. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
90. Id. at 841.
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suggesting a degree of scrutiny greater than found with some state
decisions. 9'
Two important questions remained after Nollan, however. First was
what type of development exactions the "essential nexus" test applied to.
The Court's analysis was predicated on the fact that the easement standing

alone would be a taking under the Court's physical invasion standard,
suggesting that the "essential nexus" test might be limited to physical
dedications of property.' Second, though establishing that some connection was required between the exaction and development impact, the Court
left undecided the degree of required connection,93 since the exaction failed
even the loosest of constitutional standards of review.
Lower court decisions subsequent to Nollan were divided on both
issues. Some decisions limited application of the "essential nexus" test to
physical dedications of land,' while others indicated that the standard
95
should apply to any development exaction including impact fees.
Similarly, courts differed in the degree of relationship that Nollan was
perceived as requiring, with some indicating that a high degree was
necessary," while others held that a reasonable relationship was sufficient.97 The growing difference in standards, especially with regard to the

91. Ironically, and adding some uncertainty to the decision, was the Court's claim that
its requirement of some nexus between the required exaction and projected development
impact was consistent with every state position except California. It then cited to decisions
from a number of states, id. at 839-40, including several that took highly deferential
approaches arguably at odds with the scrutiny applied by Nollan; see Billings Properties, Inc.
v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673
(N.Y. 1966). The Court in Nollan was correct in stating that all state decisions, including
those like Billings Propertiesand Jenad, required some relationship between exactions and
projected development impact. But Nollan appeared to apply a degree of scrutiny beyond
that found in some state cases applying highly deferential review.

92. See 483 U.S. at 831-34.
93. See id. at 838.

94. See Commercial Builders v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991); Blue
Jeans Equities West v. City and County of San Francisco, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 117-18 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992); see also, Karl Manheim, Tenant Eviction Protectionand the Takings Clause,
1989 Wis. L. REV. 925, 939 (1989).
95. See Weingarten v. Town of Lewisboro, 144 Misc.2d 849, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1012,
1015-18 (1989) (applying Nollan analysis to fee).

96. See William J. Jones Insurance Trust v. City of Fort Smith, 731 F.Supp. 912 (W.D.
Ark. 1990) (stating that a city must justify dedication requirements); Castle Properties Co.

v. Ackerson, 558 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y.A.D. 1990); Weingarten v. Town of Lewisboro, 144
Misc. 2d 849, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1017 (1989) (suggesting "more exacting standard" than

previous New York cases and requiring "substantial" relationship).
97. See Commercial Builders v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 442-43 (Or. 1993). For a general discussion of the different
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required degree of connection, made the time ripe for further Supreme Court
review of exactions standards, which the Court did in Dolan.
III. DOLAN V. CITY OF TiGARD98
A.

FACTS

Florence Dolan owned a plumbing and electric supply store located in
the central business district of Tigard and situated on Fanno Creek. She
applied to the city for a building permit to replace her store with a larger
store. Expansion was to take place in two phases, eventually increasing the
size of the store from 9700 square feet to 17,600 square feet and adding a
thirty-nine space paved parking lot. The proposed expansion and use were
consistent with the applicable zoning provisions in the Central Business
District in which she was located. 99
The City Planning Commission granted her permit subject to two
conditions. First, she was required to dedicate that portion of her property
falling within the city's floodplain along Fanno Creek (an area that
comprised about ten percent of her property). Second, she was required to
dedicate a fifteen foot wide strip of land adjacent to the floodplain to permit
continued development of a pedestrian/bike path.'l°
Both exactions were required under the city's Community Development
Code (CDC), which stated that when development occurs within the
floodplain, "the city shall require dedication of sufficient open land for a
greenway" and also provide land for a pedestrian/bike path within the
floodplain in accordance with an adopted pedestrian/bicycle plan. 1 1 As
a practical matter, therefore, the CDC required that when owners of land
along the floodplain applied for development requests, the Planning
Commission use the approval process to acquire property already designated
in the city's plan as set aside for the pedestrian/bike path and for the
greenway.
Ms. Dolan applied for a variance, not on the basis of unnecessary
hardship as provided for in the ordinance, but on the grounds that her

ways in which lower courts interpreted Nollan, see Kristen P. Sosnosky, Note; Dolan v. City
of Tigard: A Sequel to Nollan's Essential Nexus Test for Regulatory Takings, 73 N.C. L.
REV. 1677, 1692-97 (1995); see also, Michael M. Berger, Nollan Meets Dolan Rollin' Down
the Bikepath, 46 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., No. 2 at 3 (1994) (discussing lower court
conflicts in applying Nollan).
98. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
99. Id. at 2313-14.
100. Id. at 2314 n.2.
101. Id.
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proposed development would not conflict with the goals of the comprehensive plan.'0 2 In denying the variance, the Commission made several
findings supporting the relationship of the required dedications and the
projected impacts of her store expansion, which were in effect a series of
assumptions regarding the relationship. For example, the Commission said
it was "reasonable to assume that customers and employees" would use the
bikepath for transportation and recreation needs and that creation of the
pedestrian/bike path "could offset some of the traffic demand on nearby
streets."' 3 The Commission also stated that the flood plain dedication
was related to the Dolans' development in that development would increase
the amount of impervious surface, which in turn would cause additional
storm water run off into Fanno Creek."°
The Dolans appealed to the Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals, which
upheld the exactions under a "reasonable relationship" standard. It noted
that there was a reasonable relationship between proposed development and
a greenway dedication and also between a bike path dedication and the need
to alleviate increased traffic from development.'0 5 The Oregon Court of
Appeals affirmed on similar grounds, rejecting an argument that Nollan
required more than a reasonable relationship. 06
The Oregon Supreme Court also affirmed.'0 7 In doing so, it rejected
the Dolans' argument that Nollan required a "substantial relationship,"
holding that Nollan only required a reasonable relationship, which was met
"if the exaction serves the same purpose that a denial of the permit would
serve."' 0 8 Relying on the Commission's findings, the court found that an
"essential nexus" existed, noting that a pedestrian/bike path "could offset"
increased traffic and that the floodplain requirement was designed to
improve storm water run off which would increase with expansion of the
store. 109
B.

SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the exactions
constituted an uncompensated taking of property and were therefore

102. 114 S. Ct. at 2314 n.2.
103. Id. at 2314-15.
104. Id. at 2315.
105. Id.
106. 832 P.2d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).

107. 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993).
108. 854 P.2d at 443.
109. Id. at 443-44.
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invalid."' In doing so, the Court specifically addressed the degree of
required relationship, holding that "rough proportionality" must exist
between the required exaction and projected development impact."
It
also indicated that mere assumptions of a relationship might not be
sufficient, but that government has the burden to quantify the relationship
2
between the required exaction and development impact."
The Court began its analysis by distinguishing in two respects the type
of land use control before it from more typical land use restrictions which
are subject to a more deferential review.'
First, most land use restrictions are legislative in nature and classify large areas of land, whereas in the
case before it the city made an adjudicative decision to place a condition on
a requested building permit for an individual parcel of land." 4 Although
the Court did not elaborate on this distinction, it presumably suggested that
more scrutiny is required where an individual decision is made.
Second, the Court emphasized that this did not just involve a limitation
on land use, but instead involved a physical dedication of property." 5
That constitutes a physical invasion of property, which would normally
require just compensation to be valid. The Court then invoked the doctrine
of "unconstitutional conditions," noting that "the government may not
require a person to give up a constitutional right--here the right to just
compensation when property is taken for public use--in exchange for a
discretionary benefit where the property sought has little or no relationship
to the benefit."'" 6 Thus, as in Nollan, the Court appeared to at least in
part predicate its analysis on the fact that the condition involved a physical
invasion of property.
Having distinguished the nature of the decision in these two respects,
the Court then articulated a two part test for reviewing such decisions. First,
under Nollan, there must be an "essential nexus" between the exaction and
a legitimate state interest. Assuming such a nexus exists, the Court would
then need to decide the required degree of connection between the required
exaction and the projected impact of development, the question left open in

110. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
111. Id. at 2319-20.
112. Id. at 2320 n.8, 2321-22.
113. The Court noted that generally a land use restriction does not effect a taking if it
'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and "does not 'den[y] an owner
economically viable use of his land."' Id. at 2316 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
260 (1980)).
114. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316.
115. Id. at 2316-17.
116. Id. at 2317.
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Nollan.1
The Court then applied the "essential nexus" standard, finding such an
essential nexus to exist. It distinguished the case before it from Nollan,
noting that no "gimmicks" were used here as in Nollan.1 8 Rather, the
Court said it was "obvious" that a nexus exists between preventing flooding,
a clearly legitimate interest, and limiting development along Fanno
Creek.11 9 Similarly, the Court stated that in "theory" a pedestrian/bike
path would help reduce increased traffic that might result from development.' 2 As a practical matter, the Court applied the "essential nexus"
requirement with little rigor, suggesting that there simply be some reasonable relationship between the impact of development and the exaction. In
doing so, it seemed willing to accept common sense judgments about any
nexus that might exist. This relaxed "essential nexus" analysis undoubtedly
occurred because of the greater scrutiny to be applied under the second
prong of the test.
The Court then proceeded to the heart of the Dolan decision--the
degree of required relationship between the required exaction and the
projected development impact, the question left unanswered in Nollan. In
answering this question, the Court first reviewed state court approaches to
the issue, since states had been examining exaction practices for a long time.
The Court divided states into three general groups. First were those states
taking a very deferential approach, where even very generalized statements
regarding the required connection were sufficient.12 ' The Court rejected
this standard as too lax to provide sufficient protection for property
rights. 22 Second were those states following the "specifically and uniquely attributable" standard, which the Court described as "very exacting." The
that it was too exacting "given the
Court also rejected this standard,1 stating
23
nature of the interests involved."
The Court then aligned itself with what it called the intermediate and
majority position, which the Court said requires that there be a "reasonable

117. Id. at 2317.
118.. Id. at 2317.
119. Id. at 2317-18. As suggested by the Court's later analysis, however, the condition
in question did not just limit development along Fanno Creek, but it also required a physical
dedication of land. There arguably is no "essential nexus" between having people walk on
the property and flood control. See also id. at 2330 (Souter, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 2318.
121. Id. at 2318-19 (citing Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d
182 (Mont. 1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966)).
122. 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
123. Id.
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relationship" between the required dedication and the development
impact. 24 The Court noted that this standard was closer to what it
perceived to be the required federal standard than the other two extremes,
but was careful not to adopt it as such, partly because of the close similarity
in language to the "rational basis" test under constitutional law."z The
Court instead adopted a "rough proportionality" standard. In what is
probably the most significant language from the opinion, the Court stated:
We think a term such as 'rough proportionality' best
encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the
Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation
is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development. 26
Finally, the Court proceeded to apply this new "rough proportionality"
standard to the required dedication of a pedestrian/bike path and a greenway,
finding that both dedications failed this new test. First, it acknowledged that
restricting development in the floodplain would help confine the pressures
on Fanno Creek created by the store expansion. However, the city failed to
provide any reason why a public, as opposed to a private, greenway was
necessary. 27 Both would equally serve to address the problem of increased storm water run off caused by the store expansion. Thus, the
additional requirement of a physical dedication of the property, which would
infringe on the Dolans' right to exclude others, was altogether unrelated to
the problems posed by the development. 2 '
The Court similarly found that the required land for a pedestrian/bike
path failed to meet this new "rough proportionality" standard. The Court
acknowledged that the larger store would undoubtedly increase traffic,
noting that a formula used by the city estimated that it would generate an
additional 435 trips a day.'29 But the city failed to meet its burden of
30
establishing that the required bike path reasonably related to that impact.'
In particular, the Court noted that simply asserting that the pathway "could
offset some of the traffic" was insufficient; the city had to somehow

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

2318-19.
2320.
2320-21.
2321.
2321-22.
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quantify the extent to which the pathway would offset increased traffic. The

Court emphasized this by stating that "[n]o precise mathematical calculation
is required, but the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in
support of the dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic demand generat13
ed." 1
C. SUMMARY OF DOLAN

Dolan clearly reflects the Court's growing resolve to take property
rights seriously. Not only did it state that the takings clause should not be
"relegated to the status of a poor relation" to the First and Fourth Amendments, 33 but the Court's analysis demonstrated a seriousness of review to
protect unjustified intrusions on property interests. As such, the decision
represents part of the Court's recent trend toward a greater recognition of
property rights, a trend reflected in Nollan, First English Evangelical
of Los Angeles, 133 and Lucas v.
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
34
Commission.
South Carolina Coastal
At the same time, however, Dolan cannot be merely characterized as
a pro-property/anti-regulation case. Throughout the opinion the Court
affirmed the validity and even necessity of reasonable land use controls,
including reasonable exaction requirements designed to offset the impact of
development. 31 What Dolan opposes is using permit approvals to extort
property interests without paying just compensation. In this context, the

131. Id. at 2322.
132. Id. at 2320.
133. 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that the government must pay just compensation for
temporary regulatory taking).
134. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (holding that a land use regulation which deprives
landowner of all economic viability constitutes a taking).
135. The Court strongly affirmed the validity and even necessity of reasonable land use
controls at the beginning of its analysis, stating that they had long been sustained against
constitutional challenge and stating that "government hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every change in the
general law." 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
413 (1922). It also concluded its analysis with a similar affirmation of land use planning,
calling it "commendable" and "made necessary by increasing urbanization." It also stated
that the city's goals in Dolan were "laudable," but that there are "outer limits" in how they
can be accomplished, suggesting the validity of more normal controls. Id. at 2322.
Specifically, the validity of reasonable exactions was affirmed by the Court's own
"rough proportionality" standard, which specifically provides for reasonable exactions and
gives some leeway in pursuing them. Moreover, the Court also stated that "[d]edications for
streets, sidewalks, and other public ways are generally reasonable exactions to avoid
excessive congestion from a proposed property use." Id. at 2321.
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central message of Dolan is quite simple: government may seek exactions
to offset the impact from development, but the exactions must relate to and
flow from the development. Government cannot use a land use approval
process as an excuse to capture an interest unrelated to the impact of
development.
The Court's new "rough proportionality" test is thus best viewed as
attempting to assure that exactions relate to and flow from development
impacts while not putting an unreasonable burden on government to
establish the necessary relationships. Although the Court did not elaborate
on what the phrase actually means, both the phrase itself and the Court's
alignment with what it perceived to be the middle group of states suggests
that exactions must be limited to those responding to development impacts,
but that the Court will not require a high degree of precision in establishing
Thus, the type and extent of an exaction must be
that relationship."
justified by the need to address a development related impact. This
proportionality, however, does not have to be shown with mathematical
precision because of the type of interests involved. "Rough proportionality"
therefore reflects a balance between avoiding legislative extortion on the one
hand and permitting local government to engage in legitimate land use
practices on the other.' 37
As further noted by the Court, this "rough proportionality" between
exaction and harm must exist "both in nature and extent,"38 suggesting
several different relationships that might have to be reviewed. Indeed, in
examining whether an exaction is proportionally connected to development
impacts, there are three possible types of "relation" problems that might
arise. 139 First is where government asks for an exaction that has no
relationship or only a very tenuous one to development impacts. Both
Nollan and Dolan are examples of this type of problem. Although the
proposed development in both cases posed impact problems, the required
exaction had no real relationship to those impacts. 40 Thus, the local

136. The Court further reinforced this when it rejected the "specifi[cally] & uniquely
attributable" test. See 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
137. See Christopher J. St. Jeanos, Note, Dolan v. Tigard and the Rough Proportionality
Test: Roughly Speaking, Why Isn't a Nexus Enough?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1883, 1894

(1995).
138. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
139. For a somewhat similar analysis, see St. Jeanos, supra note 137 at 1886-87.
140. In Nollan, the required easement in no way addressed the "blockage of view" from
the street problem created by the development. Similarly, in Dolan, the public greenway
requirement, as opposed to a private greenway, was unconnected to any development impact.
Although the pedestrian/bike path was theoretically connected, the city failed to establish the
extent of the connection.
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governments were using the development as an excuse to capture an
unrelated interest.
A second type of "relation" problem is where there is no evidence that
the development in question contributed to the need to be addressed. Even
where the required exaction clearly furthers the asserted need, the exaction
is not justified because the development is unrelated to the need. For
example, conditioning development approval upon a road dedication to
minimize traffic crowding would be invalid if no evidence exists that the
Thus, even though
development would contribute to increased traffic.'
the exaction relates to the need, the development impact is unrelated to the
need.
The final type of "relation" problem is where the exaction is related in
nature to the development impact, but the government asks for a disproportionate share that clearly exceeds the impact. Here the exaction is unrelated
to development impacts, not because the type of exaction does not relate to
the problem posed, but because the degree of requested exation exceeds any
burden attributable to the development in question. Thus, if a development
would require additional park space for one hundred people, the city cannot
ask for land that would serve one thousand people. The space for the
additional nine hundred people would, in essence, be unrelated to the
development impact. Even though the development contributed to the
problem to be addressed, and even though the exaction directly addresses
that burden, that portion of the exaction that is disproportionate is unrelated
to the impact and therefore invalid.'4 2
Interestingly, although Dolan involved the first type of problem, the
vast majority of state court decisions that have invalidated exactions
involved the other two types of problems. Indeed, only one of the seven
cases cited by the Court for representing the "intermediate" reasonable
relationship position involved a Dolan type of problem; 43 the other cases
all involved the second and third categories. Nevertheless, the essence of
the "rough proportionality" standard applies to all three: there must be a

141. See, e.g., Howard County v. JJM, Inc., 482 A.2d 908, 921 (Md. 1984); Simpson
v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980); Cupp v. Board of Supervisors, 318
S.E.2d 407, 414 (Va. 1984).
142. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832 (Mo.
1977); Land/Vest Property, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 379 A.2d 200, 204-05 (N.H. 1977);
see also Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1976) (noting potential
problem that city could require exactions far out of proportion to the needs created by
subdivision).
143. See Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 651-53 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that the
required dedication of landowner's geothermal wells was unrelated to development impact).
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reasonable, though not completely precise, relationship between the required
exaction and projected development impact.
Beyond establishing the need for "rough proportionality" between
exaction and impact, the Court also indicated how that standard is to be
established and suggested several features of the new test. What is perhaps
most significant about Dolan is not so much the required degree of
connection, but rather the process of establishing that the connection is met.
In this respect, Dolan appears to impose three important requirements for
establishing "rough proportionality": (1) the burden of proof is on the
state;
(2) there must be an individual determination of the relationship; 45 and (3) in most cases there must be an effort to quantify the
relationship.1 6 Although the Court clearly indicated that mathematical
precision is not required, 47 it was equally clear that the state cannot
merely assume a relationship exists; rather, there must be an effort to
individually establish the degree of the relationship.
The Court did not spell out the type of calculations that would be
required, and instead opted for a loosely defined and flexible standard.
However, the emphasis on no mathematical precision, its use of the
adjective "rough," its rejection of the "specifi[cally] and uniquely attributable" test, 48 and its alignment with the intermediate group of states all
suggest a significant flexibility in the type of calculations that will suffice.
Appropriate factors must be considered and applied in an individual manner
to the exaction/development relationship, but less than a one-to-one
relationship is sufficient.
It also appears that the relationship must be quantified in most
instances. In finding the pedestrian/bike path dedication invalid, the Court
stated that "the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in
support of the dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the
conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic demand
generated." 49 Moreover, the concept of proportionality itself suggests the
need for quantification in order to assure an appropriate comparison. At the
same time, however, the Court accepted without question the city's
assumption of development impact on flood control, stating that "[i]t is

144. See 114 S. Ct. at 2320 n.8.
145. Id. at 2319-20 ("No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must
make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both
in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.").
146. Id. at 2322.
147. Id. at 2319, 2322.
148. Id. at 2319.
149. Id. at 2322.
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axiomatic that increasing the amount of impervious surface will increase the
quantity and rate of storm-water flow from petitioner's property."' 50 This
suggests that the need to quantify in part turns on how obvious a particular
impact or relationship is.
The rest of this article will address three major issues that remain after
Dolan: (1) to what type of land use decisions does the Dolan test apply? (2)
what impact will Dolan have on state law standards? and (3) what exactions
are most at risk under Dolan?
IV. WHEN DoEs THE DOLAN TEST APPLY?

The first general question emerging from Dolan concerns the scope of
its application, and in particular whether the new "rough proportionality"
standard applies to other than physical dedications of land. As noted earlier,
the Court began its analysis in Dolan by noting that the regulation before
it differed in two important respects from most land use restrictions. First,
most land use restrictions involve legislative determinations classifying
entire areas of a city, whereas the regulation before it involved an adjudicative decision affecting a single parcel of land. Second, the conditions
imposed in Dolan were not just a restriction on land use, but involved an
actual physical dedication of property.' 5' It was in this context that the
Court proceeded to analyze and establish its "rough proportionality" standard
with its attending requirements.
At a minimum, in noting these distinctions the Court was clearly
indicating that the new Dolan test does not.apply to the majority of land use
restrictions that involve restrictions on land pursuant to a broad legislative
restriction.' 52 Thus, typical zoning restrictions that regulate land use
would not be subject to the more intense Dolan scrutiny. 53 Even floodplain restrictions, if applied to a class of landowners and merely restricting
use, would not be subject to the new test. Although such legislative
restrictions would still need to substantially advance legitimate state interests
and not deprive the owner of economically viable use of the land, 54 they
would not be subject to the stricter Dolan standard.
On the other hand, the Dolan standard would clearly apply to
adjudicative decisions that involved a physical dedication of land. This

150. Id. at 2320.
151. Id. at 2316-17.
152. Id. at 2316.
153. See id. See also Harris v. City of Wichita, 862 F. Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1994)
(holding that Dolan did not apply to airport overlay zoning restrictions).
154. See 862 F. Supp. at 290 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
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would include most types of development approvals, such as building
permits, subdivision approval requirements, and site approval requirements,
that require land dedication. Each of these decisions is adjudicative in the
sense that they involve a condition imposed on a particular parcel of land
as opposed to a more general classification, thus raising the Court's
traditional concern for government decisions focusing on a few people.
Moreover, the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" is triggered in such
circumstances, since the applicant is potentially being asked to forego a
As a
constitutional right in exchange for a discretionary benefit."'
practical matter, therefore, almost all types of development approval which
focus on an individual parcel of property would qualify as adjudicative for
purposes of the Dolan standard.
Within these parameters, however, two issues remain regarding the
applicability of the new Dolan test. First is whether the Dolan test applies
to legislative exaction requirements that are automatically imposed as part
of an individual permit application. This would occur where the local
legislative body passes a law that requires that certain exactions be required
pursuant to certain permit processes. Post-Dolan decisions are split on this
issue, with several suggesting that Dolan is not triggered when exactions are
imposed pursuant to a legislative requirement. 5 6 The courts have reasoned that since the exaction decision was in effect made at the legislative
level, the decision is legislative and not adjudicative. Two other courts,
however, have held that such exactions are adjudicative and subject to
15 7

Dolan.

The better view is that Dolan should apply to permit conditions even
when imposed pursuant to legislative requirements. Although the decision
to require the exaction might have been legislative, the decision to which the
condition is attached, the permit approval, would be adjudicative in that it
concerns an individual parcel of land. Furthermore, it is at the individual
permit stage that the landowner is forced to forego a property interest in
order to get permit approval, thus potentially triggering the doctrine of
"unconstitutional conditions." This analysis is further borne out by Dolan
itself, where the conditions were of this type, since the city's development
code required that for development within or adjacent to the floodplain "the
city shall require dedication of sufficient open land area for [a] greenway"

155. See 114 S. Ct. at 2317.
156. See Home Builders Ass'n of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 1995 Ariz.
App. LEXIS 35 (1995); Waters Landing Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d
712, 724 (Md. 1994).
157. See J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas County, 887 P.2d 360, 363 (Or. App. 1994);
Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 884 P.2d 569, 573 (Or. App. 1994).
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and a pedestrian/bike path. 158 The mandatory nature of the requirement
indicates that the exaction requirement was made at the legislative level, yet
the Dolan court treated it as adjudicative, presumably because it was
imposed as part of a permit application on a single lot.' 59
A second and even more significant question regarding Dolan's
applicability is whether it is limited to physical dedications or whether it
also applies to other types of exactions, most notably impact fees. In both
Nollan and Dolan the Court emphasized the fact that the required conditions
involved a physical invasion of land, thus distinguishing them from general
land use restrictions. In particular, both decisions noted the Court's
traditional scrutiny of government actions that physically invade or occupy
land, emphasizing that the "right to exclude others [is] 'one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property.'" 160
The significance of a physical dedication is made apparent by its
relationship to the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," arguably the
trigger for the Court's analysis in both Nollan16' and Dolan. Although
government regulation of property will constitute a taking only in extreme
instances, 62 the Court has consistently noted that any physical invasion,
no matter how minor, will be a taking. 63 The government has the right
to take property, of course, but the Constitution requires payment of just
compensation."'4 Thus, when government requires physical dedication of
land as a condition of permit approval, it is asking the landowner to forego
the constitutional right to just compensation. According to the Court in
Dolan, this triggers the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," which
states that the person can be made to forego a constitutional right for a

158. See 114 S. Ct. at 2314 & n.2 (quoting CDC §§ 18.120 - 180.A.8, App. to Brief
for Respondent).
159. Id. at 2316 ("here the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's
application for a building permit on an individual parcel.").
160. See 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176
(1979)); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
161. See Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term--Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REv. 4, 61 (1988)
(stating that Nollan Court relied on doctrine "in all but name").
162. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 (1992)
(holding it as a taking if denies all economic viability); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980).
163. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan (citing CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
438-41 (1982) (holding that a state-required cable line across property constitutes a taking).
164. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

1995]

LEGAL LIMITS ON DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS

discretionary benefit only if the property interest is related to that bene16
fit. 5
The above analysis might well suggest that Dolan's "rough proportionality" test is limited to physical dedications. This would give it a clear
constitutional ground in that line of cases finding any physical invasion a
taking. Indeed, some courts and commentators have interpreted Nollan as
only applying to physical dedications, '6 though others would apparently
apply it to fees as well as dedications. 6 Early response to Dolan indicates a similar split among commentators.1
Despite the Court's emphasis on the physical nature of the restrictions
in both Nollan and Dolan, there are several reasons that support expanding
the test to impact fees as well as physical dedications of property.' 69 First,
three days after Dolan was announced, the Court vacated a California Court
of Appeal decision in Ehrlich v. City of Culver 70 for reconsideration in
light of its decision in Dolan. Ehrlichdid not involve a physical dedication,
however, but rather a $280,000 recreational facilities fee. Tie Court's

165. See 114 S. Ct. at 2317.
166. See, e.g., Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir.
1991); Blue Jeans Equities West v. City & County of San Francisco, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114,
118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Manheim, supra note 94 at 950.
167. See, e.g., Weingarten v. Town of Lewisboro, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1015-18 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989); see generally'Berger,supra note 97 at 3.
168. Compare, e.g., Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek, Thou Shalt Not Take Title
Without Adequate Planning: The Takings Equation After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 27 URB.
187, 201-03 (1995) (applying the test only to physical dedications) with Terry D. Morgan,
Exactions as Takings: Tactics for Dealing with Dolan, 46 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3,
5 (1994) (applying the test to impact fees as well as physical dedications).
169. It has been suggested that impact fees might be a physical dedication of the
requested money itself and thus subject to Nollan on that basis. See Frank Michelman, The
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 n.63 (1988). That argument
appears problematic, and seems to be precluded by the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989). In Sperry, the Court reviewed a Fourth Circuit
decision that had held that a federal government could not require claimants to pay a
percentage of any award from the Iran Claims Commission, treating the fee as a physical
taking of property (the money). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that taking a
percentage of awards was a permissible means of reimbursing the costs of the Commission.
In a footnote, the Court questioned the circuit court's treatment of the fee as a physical
taking, stating that "[i]t is artificial to view deductions of a percentage of a monetary award
as a physical appropriation of property. Unlike real or personal property, money is fungible."
493 U.S. at 62 n.9. The impact fee as physical taking argument has been rejected by at least
one court. See Commercial Builders of Northern California v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d
872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991).
170. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), cert. grantedand judgment vacated by
114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
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specific instruction to reconsider in light of Dolan suggests that it did not
necessarily intend for its analysis to be limited to only physical dedications."'
Second, the primary concern behind the Dolan test--that local
governments will use their monopoly power to seek exactions unrelated to
the impact of development--applies equally to impact fees as well as to
physical exactions. Although the Court in Dolan affirmed the right to seek
exactions that correspond to development impacts, it emphasized that local
governments could not use their power to extort conditions from developers. 172 This is especially true when you recognize that impact fees can be
used to acquire property that might otherwise be sought through dedication.
Thus, a local government could impose an impact fee for parks, the
proceeds of which are used to acquire through eminent domain a portion of
the applicant's land. It would make little sense to apply a lesser standard
to impact fees in such situations and thereby allow cities to indirectly
acquire title to property.
Third, state court decisions, to which the Supreme Court looked for
some guidance in Dolan, have applied, in essence, the same standard to both
physical dedications and to impact fees. 173 If anything, courts have
perhaps more closely scrutinized impact fees because of their unique nature.
In recent years, however, courts have generally applied a similar analysis to
both types of exactions and usually expressed comparable concerns in
assessing their legitimacy. Although this in no way binds the Court in its
analysis, it provides additional support to the idea that Dolan's central
thesis, which requires that exactions relate to development impacts, applies
equally to physical dedications and impact fees.
Finally, the Court's emphasis on a physical dedication in Dolan was
made in contrast to general use restrictions, with the Court stating "the
conditions imposed were not simply a limitation on the use petitioner might
make of her parcel, but a requirement that she deed portions of theproperty
to the city.' 74 Arguably, the Court's primary concern here was not
necessarily to predicate its analysis on a physical dedication, but rather to
171. But see, Freilich & Bushek, supra note 168 at 204 (stating that it is entirely
plausible that on remand, the Ehrlich court will conclude that Dolan is limited to physical
dedications and therefore the original decision was correct).
172. See 114 S. Ct. at 2317.
173. See, e.g.,
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965)
(applied same analysis to both dedication and fee requirements); Contractors & Builders
Ass'n of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 320-21 (Fla. 1976); Divan
Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Wayne, 334 A.2d 30, 38-40 (N.J. 1975); Bosselman &
Stroud, supra note 18 at 75-76.
174. 114 S. Ct. at 2316.
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distance it from run-of-the-mill use restrictions, which comprise the core of
zoning regulations. In this regard, impact fees more closely resemble
dedications than use restrictions. Both dedications and impact fees are
typically made pursuant to an adjudicatory approval process and are
affirmative obligations designed to offset the burdens caused by development; indeed, dedication requirements often include fee in lieu of alternatives. Thus the Court's opening distinctions can be seen as insulating
traditional use restrictions from the new Dolan test, but not necessarily
precluding its application to impact fees.
For these reasons, it makes sense to apply the Dolan "rough proportionality" analysis to the imposition of any exaction to an individual permit
approval. To the extent that Dolan turns on the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, 75 this might require that the Court recognize property interests76
other than the right to exclude as sufficient to trigger the doctrine.
Alternatively, the Court could ground its analysis in substantive due process,
rather than the Takings Clause, and recognize exactions unrelated to
development impacts as arbitrary.
Ostensibly, Dolan might be limited to physical dedications--the reading
given Nollan by some lower court decisions. However, the better view is
to apply it to any exaction imposed on an individual request for development, where development approval on a specific parcel of land is conditioned on the requested exaction. Such an interpretation corresponds better
to the policy concerns underlying Dolan. Conversely, mere restrictions on
land use applied in a legislative manner should not be subject to the Dolan
standard.
V.

77

WHAT IMPACT WILL DoLAN HAVE ON STATE LAW STANDARDS?

One of the most important questions emerging from Dolan is what
impact it will have on state law standards governing exaction requirements.
To some extent the issue might appear circuitous, since Dolan looked to
state cases for guidance and affirmed what it viewed as the intermediate and
majority "reasonable relationship" test when it established its new "rough

175. See The Supreme Court, 1993 Term--Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 296-

97 (1994) (arguing that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is a poor basis on which
to decide Dolan on); see also Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987
Sup. CT. REV. 1, 39-41 (stating that Court did not need to resort to the "troublesome"
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in deciding Nollan).
176. See Merriam & Hyman, Dealing with Dolan, Practicallyand Jurisprudentially,in
1995 ZONING & PLAN. HANDBOOK 111, 125-26; Freilich & Bushek, supra note 168 at 204177. See 114 S. Ct. at 2316.
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proportionality" standard. 7 ' Arguably, rather than examining Dolan's
impacts upon current state practices, those state practices should be
examined to help interpret the ambiguities of Dolan. As suggested earlier,
current state practices should be examined to help interpret Dolan to the
extent they would not appear inconsistent with the standards set out in
Dolan.
For several reasons, however, it is not correct to assume that Dolan
merely adopted an intermediate level "reasonable relationship" test which the
Court believed was adopted by a majority of states and that states adopting
that standard will not be affected. First, a close reading of Dolan indicates
that although the Court closely aligned itself with what it perceived to be the
majority approach, it was careful in its language not to adopt it as such.
Rather, the Court stated that the "reasonable relationship" test was "closer
to the federal constitutional norm" than either of the other approaches. 179
Also, the Court indicated that it was not adopting the 'reasonable relationship" test as such, "partly" because of its similarity to the "rational basis"
standard in constitutional law."s This suggested that differences between
the two tests might be more than just mere semantics. 18 ' Although too
much should not be made of the Court's choice of words, the Court did
seem to be careful to avoid adopting any particular state approach as such.
Second, as discussed in part I.B, state courts use the term "reasonable
relationship" in diverse ways, at times resulting in rather deferential
review."' Indeed, all three Oregon courts which reviewed the conditions
in Dolan applied what they articulated as a "reasonable relationship"
standard and found the conditions valid.' 83 The meaning they gave to the
term was obviously much different from that given by the Supreme Court.
Other courts have, at times, used the "reasonable relationship" standard in
a very differential manner.'8' For these reasons it cannot be assumed that
the Court merely endorsed the "reasonable relationship" test, considering the
variety of applications courts give it.
Any assessment of how Dolan affects state law standards must
therefore look beyond the Court's general approval or rejection of broad
approaches and assess the extent to which the test itself is consistent with

178. Id. at 2318-19.
179. Id. at 2319.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See infra text accompanying notes 30-66.
183. See 854 P.2d 437, 442-43 (Or. 1993); 832 P.2d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
184. See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 207 P.2d I (Cal. 1947); Holmes
v. Planning Bd. of Town of New Castle, 433 N.Y.S.2d 587, 598 (N.Y. 1980).
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state law practices. This is not to say that the Court's general approval of
various cases and standards of review is not significant. Clearly in
discussing cases the Court was giving guidance as to what it viewed to be
an appropriate level of inquiry and the required degree of relationship
between exactions and development impact. However, in other respects,
particularly in how the relationship is established, Dolan arguably goes
beyond many state cases.
Given the decision's ambiguities and the fluid nature of state law,
assessing the impact of Dolan on state law is not easy. Nevertheless,
Dolan's potential impact on state standards might be assessed in two general
areas: first, the degree of relationship required between exactions and
development impacts; and second, proof requirements in establishing the
relationship. Dolan's first potential impact on state standards concerns the
required degree of relationship between exactions and development impact.
Here Dolan's impact appears to be limited, with most courts already
requiring a standard comparable to "rough proportionality." As noted
earlier, the "rough proportionality" test flows from Dolan's central thesis:
that exactions are justified where they address development impacts, but
they cannot be used simply as a means to capture desired property interests.
As such, the proportionality standard arguably involves a loose form of cost
accounting, where some attempt must be made to insure that the required
exactions are proportionate to the development burden. Although the Court
clearly rejected the need for any precise accounting as being unrealistic
given the nature of the interests involved, it also made clear that an attempt
must be made to relate the type and extent of exactions to development
impacts. "'
This same type of rough cost accounting is also required by many
decisions applying the "rational nexus" and "reasonable relationship" tests.
Although not requiring precise accounting, the rational nexus test is often
interpreted as requiring some proportionate relationship between the exaction
For example, the most frequently used
and development impact.8
articulation of the rational nexus test states that a developer can be required
to pay only that "portion that bears a rational nexus,"18 7 which courts have
interpreted as being a proportionality.88 or apportionment 89 standard.

185. See 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
186. See generally, Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 18; see also Robert H. Frielich,
The 1993-94 Supreme Court Review, 26 URB. 685 n.569 (1994).
187. See, e.g., Longridge Builders v. Planning Bd. of Township of Princeton, 245 A.2d
336, 337 (N.J. 1968); Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 376 S.E.2d 22, 30 (N.C. Ct. App.
1989).
188. See Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 379 A.2d 200, 204-05 (N.J.
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Other courts have used similar language suggesting proportionality, at times
identifying various factors to be used in assessing the relationship." °
Therefore, as suggested by Dolan,'9' the new "rough proportionality"
standard is comparable to the degree of relationship already required in
many state decisions; indeed, the similarity of standards suggests that in this
area, resort should be made to state court decisions in understanding the
dimensions of "rough proportionality."
Nevertheless, the "rough proportionality" standard is clearly inconsistent
with those decisions which have applied the "reasonable relationship" test
in a deferential fashion. As noted earlier, some state courts have applied the
reasonable relationship standard as simply requiring "some" degree of
relationship between exaction and development impact, a standard comparable to that used in minimal scrutiny constitutional analysis. 92 Although
this assures that the exaction is not altogether unrelated to the development,
it fails to address the concern that the amount or type of exaction might be
largely unrelated to the development. As such, they permit municipalities
to engage in the very practice condemned by Dolan: imposing exactions that
are not required by the development impact.
Thus, the new "rough proportionality" standard will clearly impact
those states that have traditionally required only some degree of relationship
to support development exactions. This more relaxed approach is perhaps
best illustrated by the lower courts in Dolan, which applied the reasonable
relationship standard in such a manner so as to only require some relationship. Over the years, California' 93 and New York 94 courts have applied

1977).
189. See Longridge Builders v. Planning Bd. of Township of Princeton, 245 A.2d 336,
338 (N.J. 1968).
190. See, e.g., Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Mo.
1977) ("to the extent" of the created need); City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680
S.W.2d 802, 807 (Tex. 1984) (identifying factors to be used in assessing the relationship);
Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (Minn. 1976) (holding that a "reasonable
portion" based on the created need); Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606,
610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (utilizing a "pro rata share" test).
191. See 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
192. See Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 207 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1947); Holmes v.
Planning Bd. of New Castle, 433 N.Y.S.2d 587, 598 (N.Y. 1980).
193. See Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal.
1971); Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 207 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1947); Grupe v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Remmenga v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 209 Cal. Rptr. 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
194. See Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966); Holmes v.
Planning Bd. of New Castle, 433 N.Y.S.2d 587 (N.Y. 1980). See also Olshaker, supra note
41 at 1872 (suggesting New York courts deferential when reviewing exaction schemes
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the reasonableness standard in a similar fashion, suggesting that any
relationship that was within the police power would suffice to support
development exactions. Such a relaxed analysis cannot be sustained under
Dolan.
The second and more significant impact that Dolan will have on state
standards is in the requirements for establishing that "rough proportionality"
exists. In this respect, Dolan appears to impose three important require95
ments: (1) the burden of proof is on the state;' (2) there must be an
9
individual determination of the required relationship;" and (3) there must
97 Although the Court clearly
be some effort to quantify the relationship.'
9
indicated that mathematical precision was not required, it was equally
clear that the state cannot merely assume a relationship exists; rather, there
must be an effort to quantify it.
As might be expected, state court decisions take a variety of positions
on these issues. Some decisions appear to put the burden of proof on the
state, at times requiring some degree of quantification. For example, in 181
Incorporated v. Salem,' 99 the court rejected the use of "a hypothetical,
theoretical projection," instead stating that the exaction had to be justified
2
on proven impacts flowing from the questioned development. 00 Since the
city could establish only a limited traffic increase from the development in
question, the court held that the required relationship had not been
established. 2"' Similarly, other courts have struck down exactions when
the state had failed to establish clear evidence of the development impact. 20 2 Moreover, most courts applying the rational nexus test appear to
assessment of how the exaction relates
require some type of individualized
203
impact.
to the development
authorized by state statute).
195. 114 S. Ct. at 2320 n.8.
196. Id. at 2319-20.
197. Id. at 2321-22.
198. Id. at 2319, 2322.
199. 336 A.2d 501 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975).
200. Id. at 506.
201. Id. at 507.
202. See, e.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) ("local government must demonstrate a ... rational nexus"); Lafferty v. Payson
City, 642 P.2d 376 (Utah,1982).
203. See, e.g., Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980)
(finding no evidence that development would generate additional traffic to justify street
dedication); State ex rel. Nuland v. St. Louis County, 478 S.W.2d 363, 367-68 (Mo. 1972)
(finding no evidence that development would generate additional traffic to justify street
dedication); Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 379 A.2d 200, 205 (N.H. 1977)
(holding that the rational nexus test requires consideration of a variety of factors applied to
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At the same time, however, a number of decisions appear to have
required a less demanding basis for establishing the relationship. First, some
courts place the burden on the developer to establish that the relationship is
not reasonable." 4 This is true for some decisions that appear to require
a proportionality requirement.2 5 Second, some courts have accepted more
generalized statements of the required relationship. In extreme cases, courts
have deferred to legislative findings that such a relationship exists.2'
Other courts have applied what might be termed a "common sense"
approach, simply assuming that particular developments will have impacts
and that exactions will obviously offset those impacts. 20 7
Even decisions putting the burden of proof on the state and requiring
some evidence of the exaction/development relationship often fall short of
clearly requiring that the relationship be quantified. For example, in
Simpson v. City of North Platte,0 8 a decision cited approvingly several
times in Dolan, the Nebraska Supreme Court applied a reasonable relationship test to strike down a required road dedication because there was no
evidence that the development in question would increase traffic. 2' 9
Nowhere did the court suggest a need to quantify the relationship, however.
Indeed, in none of the reasonable relationship cases cited by the majority in
Dolan in support of its "rough proportionality" standard did the courts
clearly articulate a quantification requirement. 21
Therefore, Dolan's greatest effect upon state law will probably come
from the requirement that local governments make an individual determination that quantifies the relationship between exaction and projected

particular facts); see also Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832, 835
(Mo. 1977) (holding that subdividers can "introduce evidence on the fairness of specific
exactions to specific properties").
204. See, e.g., City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 806-07
(Tex. 1984) (placing the burden on the developer "to demonstrate that there is no such
reasonable connection"); Home Builders Ass'n v. Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Mo.
1977) (placing the burden on the developer); Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 18 at 81
(stating that the burden of proof normally rests on the challenger to the exaction).
205. See City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 806-07 (Tex.
1984).
206. See Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964).
207. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 443-44 (Or. 1993).
208. 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980).
209. Id. at 300-01.
210. See Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983); Collis v. City of Bloomington,
246 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1976); Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980);
City of College Station v. Turtle RockCorp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984); Call v. West
Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442
(Wis. 1965).
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development impact. Even here, however, the extent of Dolan's impact is
not altogether clear, in part because of the uncertainty regarding whether all
exaction relationships must be quantified, or only those of an unusual nature.
Nevertheless, Dolan clearly disapproves of assumptions that are not
axiomatic and suggests that most impacts and relationships must be
quantified. As such, common assumptions about development impacts and
relations between those impacts and required exactions would appear to be
on dangerous ground after Dolan.
Finally, a brief word should be said about what impact, if any, Dolan
will have on the types of exaction/impact relationships that states must
examine. As suggested earlier, Dolan requires examination of three
relationships: (1) whether the exaction alleviates the created harm; (2)
whether the development created the need in question; and (3) whether the
extent of the exaction is proportionate to that portion of the need attributable
to the development. Nollan and Dolan both involved the first type of
problem, where the exaction failed to address the need justifying regulation.
Conversely, most state decisions have focused on the second and third
concerns, with little scrutiny of whether an exaction would in fact alleviate
the purported harm. It might appear, therefore, that Dolan requires state
courts to shift their analytical focus.
Although the type of relationship scrutinized in Nollan and Dolan is
distinct from the focus of most state cases, the analysis is nevertheless
consistent with state exaction cases in several respects. First, as in Nollan,
courts have struck down exactions that have no relationship to development
impacts."' Second, the component of the rational nexus test that requires
a sufficient relationship between the exaction and benefits conferred upon
a subdivision is similar to Dolan's requirement that the efficacy of an
exaction be quantified. Although not a common focus of discussion, courts
have in essence interpreted that requirement to mean that the required
exaction, usually impact fees, will in fact be used to address the created
need giving rise to the exaction. Thus, courts have emphasized that fees
collected must be specially restricted to addressing the need2 2 and that
time limits be put on their use. More relevant to Dolan, courts have also
noted that land for parks must be within a reasonable proximity of the
development. 1 3

211. See, e.g., Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 651-53 (9th Cir. 1983) (requiring a
dedication of landowner's geothermal wells had no development impact).
212. See, e.g., Contractors and Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin,
329 So. 2d 314, 320-21 (Fla. 1976); see generally, Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 18 at
80-81.
213. See City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 807 (Tex.
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As a practical matter, therefore, the exaction/benefit requirement of the
rational nexus test would appear to be similar in purpose to Dolan's
requirement that the exaction in fact address the created need. Because
exactions are justified only when in response to projected development
impacts, to be valid the exaction must be used to offset the impact which
justified it in the first place. Otherwise, development impacts would be
nothing more than an excuse to acquire interests unrelated to the impacts.
In this sense Dolan's requirement that the state quantify the extent to which
the exaction offsets development impacts is consistent with the broad focus
and concerns of the rational nexus test.
VI. WHAT EXACTIONS ARE MOST AT RISK UNDER DoLAN?

The final question raised by Dolan are what types of exactions will be
most at risk under the new "rough proportionality" standard. Predictions are
difficult here, not only because of the uncertainty that still surrounds some
of the decision, but also because under Dolan the validity of any particular
exaction is based on whether it can be properly justified. Nevertheless,
some general observations can be made regarding the types of exactions that
might or might not be valid.
First, one clear principle that does emerge from Dolan is that most at
risk will be those exactions that are imposed because the local government
has already decided that it wants the land in question and uses the
development approval process as a means to get it. Whatever its ambiguities, Dolan makes clear that to be valid, development exactions must be in
response to the projected impacts of development. Where a development
process is merely an excuse to obtain land already designated for public use,
there is often little relationship to development impacts, and therefore, the
process is invalid.
Indeed, both Nollan and Dolan involved precisely this type of improper
scheme. The required exactions in both cases were imposed, not because
of the perceived development impacts, but rather because the dedications in
24
question had already been designated for acquisition in official plans. '
In both cases the development approval process merely provided the means
by which the property interests could be acquired. At a minimum, both
decisions clearly state that exaction conditions must be driven not by a
preexisting desire for the required property but as an attempt to offset
development impacts.

1984).
214. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2314 n.2 (1994); Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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The Dolan decision makes the common municipal practice of using the
development exaction process as a means to capture already targeted tracts
of land without paying just compensation highly questionable. Such
exactions are not per se invalid, because the required exaction might turn
out to be proportional to the development impact. However, in most
instances, any proportional relationship would be fortuitous, since the type
and extent of the exaction is determined by the preexisting determination of
the plan rather than the impact of the development. Moreover, Nollan and
Dolan send a clear signal that such exactions are to be closely scrutinized.
Conversely, those exactions least at risk under Dolan are those that are
imposed in an honest effort to offset the impacts of development. Dolan
clearly affirms that, if properly established, such exactions are a valid
response to projected development impacts. As a general matter, such
exactions will be valid if the local government can establish that the
proposed development creates the need for the exactions, the degree of
required exaction is proportionate to the need attributable to the development
in question, and the local government can quantify the above.
As would be expected, many of the same types of exactions that might
be at risk under the rational nexus standard will also be at risk under
Dolan's "rough proportionality" standard. First, exactions will be at risk if
the need for the exaction was not generated by the proposed development. 2'5 Second, an exaction will be invalid where it asks for too
much,2" 6 such as where a residential development adds two hundred
people to the community but the exaction is for a park site for one thousand.
Third, and most obvious, is where the exaction fails to address the purported
development impact. All three of the above pose the same basic problem
under Dolan by seeking exactions unrelated to development impact.
Particular types of exaction schemes, even if sincere efforts to offset
development impacts, might also be at risk under Dolan. Most apparent
would be pre-set standards that do not provide for an individual assessment
of development impact, such as where any development would be required
to automatically pay a fee or dedicate a portion of land. Such pre-set
standards would fail to meet Dolan's requirement for an individualized
assessment of development impact.
Perhaps the most common example of such pre-set standards are
requirements that a developer dedicate a fixed percentage of land for a park

215. See, e.g., Howard County v. JJM, Inc., 482 A.2d 908, 921 (Md. 1984); Simpson
v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980).
216. See, e.g., Land/VestoProperties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 379 A.2d 200, 204-05
(N.H. 1977); Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. 1977).
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or school site in order to get development approval." 7 Lower courts have
split on their validity, with some courts finding that it provided a sufficient
relationship.1
Such fixed percentage requirements would appear to
violate Dolan's requirement for an individualized assessment of impact,
since not all development of the same acreage would have the same impact
on schools or parks. As a practical matter, the development impact of both
is a consequence of population and not acreage, and thus would seem to fall
short of the "rough proportionality" required by Dolan.
A more difficult question is whether rough formulas based on
population would suffice to meet the requirements of "rough proportionality," or whether more sophisticated formulas are required. Dolan does not
give a clear answer, but several factors seem to suggest that rather
unsophisticated measures of relationship might suffice as long as an effort
is made to apply the rough calculation to the specific facts of the development. First, Dolan emphasized in two places that mathematical precision is
not required in quantifying the relationship. 9 Second, the phrase "rough
proportionality" itself suggests the acceptability of rather loose methods of
calculation. Moreover, the Court in Dolan appeared to accept without
question a rather rough calculation of traffic impact, suggesting that rough
calculations are sufficient.2"
Thus, the type of exaction schemes that would appear most consistent
with Dolan are those that use formulas that apply previously developed
methodologies which provide for individual assessment. Although Dolan
is not completely clear regarding how sophisticated a methodology must be,
the decision suggests that calculations can be relatively rough in nature as
long as they provide for an individual assessment of proportionate share.
Not only does the term "rough proportionality" itself suggest some leeway
in calculations, but the Court twice emphasized that mathematical precision
was not required. Moreover, the Court specifically rejected any exacting

217. See, e.g., Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 218 (Utah 1979) (holding that
a developer must dedicate seven percent of land for flood plain and/or parks).
218. See Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26-7 (Minn. 1976) (holding
that a ten percent dedication requirement shall be interpreted to provide a developer an
opportunity to rebut and thus, was valid); Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220
(Utah 1979) (upholding a seven percent dedication requirement).
219. See 114 S. Ct. at 2319, 2322.
220. The Court stated that it had "no doubt that the city was correct in finding" that the
proposed expansion would increase traffic, noting that the city had estimated an increase of
"roughly 435 additional trips per day." It then summarized the city's methodology in a
footnote, stating that it used an average of 53.21 trips per 1,000 square feet, and then
multiplied that by the additional square footage to arrive at the estimated increase of 435
trips per day. ld. at 2321 & n.9.
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level of relationship as it perceived was required under the "specific and
uniquely attributable" test. For all these reasons the Dolan "rough
proportionality" standard would seem to tolerate rather rough means of
calculation.
Finally, it is safe to say that impact fees would generally fare better
under the Dolan analysis than physical dedications. Not only might impact
fees not be subject to the Dolan requirements to begin with, but by their
very nature they are more easily tailored to actual development impacts and
thus meet the proportionality test. To the extent that the impact fee is
designed to assess a particular development's contribution to a community
need and then to assess a fair fee for its share, impact fees would seem quite
compatible with Dolan. This is not to say that impact fees automatically
meet the Dolan test; clearly fees that are arbitrarily assigned with no effort
to quantify actual impacts would be invalid. Yet, by their very naturb
impact fees lend themselves to the quantification and individualized
assessment required by Dolan and as a general method would not appear to
be at risk under Dolan.221
Indeed, it might be argued that local governments should generally shift
from physical dedications to impact fees as a means to meet the Dolan
standards, because fees provide greater flexibility in establishing proportionality. In some instances this may be appropriate, such as where government
needs a physical dedication of minimum size to serve its purposes. For
example, the pedestrian/bike path and greenway in Dolan required a set size
from each landowner to be effective, yet impacts would vary. Since the size
of the desired exaction in such situations remain constant for uniformity
purposes, but the development impact would vary depending on the
anticipated use, such a scheme would likely violate Dolan'sproportionality
standard in some instances. A better alternative would be an impact fee that
could then be pooled to
could be tailored to the individual impacts, which
222
purchase the needed land in a uniform manner.
Other types of physical dedications, such as for parks or schools, would
not appear problematic under Dolan if approached properly. Since such
dedication requirements typically include fee-in-lieu provisions anyway, 223,
they avoid the problem of seeking minimum dedications that might not be
justified by the particular development impact. Moreover, park and school

221. See Merriam & Lyman, supra note 176 at 122 (noting that impact fees can be
closely calibrated and suggesting that their popularity might increase after Dolan).
222. See Eric Damian Kelly, Supreme Court Strikes Middle Ground on Exactions Test,
46 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 6, 8-9 (July 1994).
223. See, e.g., City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex.
1984); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965).
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dedication sites can often be secured from one developer and thus closely
tailored to created needs.
CONCLUSION

As previously stated, the basis message of Dolan is relatively simple:
government may impose exactions to offset the impact of development, but
the exactions must relate to and flow from the development itself.
Government cannot use the land approval process to capture an interest
unrelated to the impact of development. As such, the decision attempts to
strike a reasonable balance between the property rights of landowners and
the legitimate planning needs of local governments.
The Court's new "rough proportionality" standard should be seen in this
light. By requiring proportionality between exaction and development
impact, the Court established that the exaction must relate to development
impacts, not only in nature, but also degree. Yet the Court repeatedly made
clear that the relationship did not have to be established with precision, thus
deferring to the practical constraints faced by government in this area. As
a practical matter, "rough proportionality" provides government with
substantial room with which to work, although the burden will clearly be on
the government to justify exactions that are imposed.
Although the full impact of Dolan is yet to be seen, several predictions
can be made about its potential impact. First, Dolan's "rough proportionality" standard should not have a significant impact in those states adopting
the majority "rational nexus" test. Although Dolan has shifted the burden
of proof for some states and might require greater quantification, the
required degree of relationship under "rough proportionality" appears
comparable to that required under rational basis. Conversely, those states
applying the "reasonable relationship" standard to only require some
connection between exaction and impact will be more clearly impacted by
the more rigorous Dolan requirements.
Second, Dolan should not pose a threat to most types of exactions that
are imposed in an honest effort to offset the impacts of development and
provide for an individual determination of the exaction/impact relationship.
Conversely, most at risk will be those exactions imposed because the
government has already decided that it wants the land in question and uses
the development approval process as a means to get it. Further, although
impact fees should be subject to the Dolan test, they should not be at risk
if properly prepared, because by their very nature they lend themselves to
the quantification and individualized assessment by Dolan. Thus, Dolan
might encourage some shift from physical dedications to use of impact fees.
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Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Dolan must be seen as the
latest of several recent Supreme Court decisions affirming the importance
of property rights." Although none of these recent decisions drastically
alters the landscape of land use controls, together they demonstrate the
Court's resolve to take property rights seriously. Local governments can
engage in reasonable and responsive land use planning, but they must
clearly be sensitive to the impact on property owners. In the long run, that
might be Dolan's most significant impact.

224. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).

